Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check from Lattices by Nguyen, Khoa et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
2.
05
00
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 F
eb
 20
18
Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check from Lattices
Khoa Nguyen, Benjamin Hong Meng Tan, Huaxiong Wang
Division of Mathematical Sciences,
School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
{khoantt,tanh0199,hxwang}@ntu.edu.sg
Abstract. Passwords are ubiquitous and most commonly used to authenticate users when logging into online ser-
vices. Using high entropy passwords is critical to prevent unauthorized access and password policies emerged to
enforce this requirement on passwords. However, with current methods of password storage, poor practices and
server breaches have leaked many passwords to the public. To protect one’s sensitive information in case of such
events, passwords should be hidden from servers. Verifier-based password authenticated key exchange, proposed
by Bellovin and Merrit (IEEE S&P, 1992), allows authenticated secure channels to be established with a hash of
a password (verifier). Unfortunately, this restricts password policies as passwords cannot be checked from their
verifier. To address this issue, Kiefer and Manulis (ESORICS 2014) proposed zero-knowledge password policy
check (ZKPPC). A ZKPPC protocol allows users to prove in zero knowledge that a hash of the user’s password
satisfies the password policy required by the server. Unfortunately, their proposal is not quantum resistant with the
use of discrete logarithm-based cryptographic tools and there are currently no other viable alternatives. In this work,
we construct the first post-quantum ZKPPC using lattice-based tools. To this end, we introduce a new randomised
password hashing scheme for ASCII-based passwords and design an accompanying zero-knowledge protocol for
policy compliance. Interestingly, our proposal does not follow the framework established by Kiefer and Manulis and
offers an alternate construction without homomorphic commitments. Although our protocol is not ready to be used
in practice, we think it is an important first step towards a quantum-resistant privacy-preserving password-based
authentication and key exchange system.
1 Introduction
One of the most common methods of user authentication is passwords when logging in to online services. So,
it is very important that passwords in use have sufficient entropy and hard to guess for security. Password
policies was introduced to guide users into choosing suitable passwords that are harder to guess. Ur et
al. [51] discovered that users are more likely to choose easily guessable passwords in the absence of a
password policy. Examining the password policies of over 70 web-sites, Floreˆncio and Herley [18] found
that most require passwords with characters from at least one of four sets, digits, symbols, lowercase and
uppercase letters and a minimum password length. Hence, it is reasonable to focus on password policies with
a minimum password length, sets of valid characters and maybe constraints on the diversity of characters
used.
Even with strong passwords and good policies, nothing can prevent leaks if servers do not properly store
passwords. Improperly stored passwords can cause serious problems, as seen by hacks on LinkedIn [20] and
Yahoo [47] and the web-site “Have I Been Pwned?” [26]. Sadly, such poor practices are not uncommon:
many popular web-sites were discovered by Baumann et al. [4] to store password information in plaintext.
If servers cannot be trusted, then no password information should be stored there at all. Thus, protocols
that do not require storing secret user information at external servers become necessary. However, even
with secret passwords, password policies are important to enforce a base level of security against dictionary
attacks, leaving a dilemma: how do users prove compliance of their password without revealing anything?
Kiefer and Manulis [31] showed how to address this problem with zero knowledge password policy
check (ZKPPC). It enables blind registration: users register a password with a server and prove password
policy conformance without revealing anything about their passwords, thereby solving the dilemma. With
ZKPPC, some randomised password verification information is stored at the server and it does not leak in-
formation about the password, protecting against server compromises. Furthermore, ZKPPC allows a user
to prove, without revealing any information, that the password conforms to the server’s policy. Blind regis-
tration can be coupled with a verifier-based password-based authenticated key exchange (VPAKE) protocol
to achieve a complete system for privacy-preserving password-based registration, authentication and key
exchange. Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [6, 5, 21, 28, 15, 8] is a protocol that al-
lows users to simultaneously authenticate themselves using passwords and perform key exchange. However,
these protocols store passwords on the server and thus, users have to trust the security of the server’s pass-
word storage and may be vulnerable to password leakages in the event of server compromise. Verifier-based
PAKE [7, 5, 22, 11] extends PAKE to limit the damage caused by information leakage by storing a verifier
instead. Verifiers are a means to check that users supplied the correct passwords and are usually hash values
of passwords with a salt, which makes it hard to extract the passwords from verifiers.
A ZKPPC protocol allows users to prove that their password, committed in the verifier, satisfies some
password policy. VPAKE can then be used to securely authenticate and establish keys whenever communi-
cation is required. Together, the password is never revealed, greatly increasing the user security over current
standards. Passwords are harder to guess and no longer easily compromised by server breaches.
Kiefer and Manulis [31] proposed a generic construction of ZKPPC using homomorphic commitments
and set membership proofs. In the same work, a concrete ZKPPC protocol was constructed using Pedersen
commitments [45], whose security is based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. As such, it
is vulnerable to attacks from quantum adversaries due to Shor’s algorithm [49] which solves the discrete
logarithm problem in quantum polynomial time. With NIST issuing a call for proposals to standardize
quantum resistant cryptography [44], it is clear that we need to prepare cryptographic schemes and protocols
that are quantum resistant, in case a sufficiently powerful quantum computer is realized. As there is currently
no proposal of ZKPPC protocol that has the potential to be quantum resistant, it is an interesting open
problem to construct one.
OUR CONTRIBUTIONS AND TECHNIQUES. In this work, inspired by the attractiveness of ZKPPC proto-
cols and the emergence of lattice-based cryptography as a strong quantum resistant candidate, we aim to
construct a ZKPPC protocol from lattices. Our contribution is two-fold. We first design a randomised pass-
word hashing scheme based on the hardness of the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. We then construct
a SIS-based statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge, which allows the client to convince the
server that his secret password, committed in a given hash value, satisfies the server’s policy. This yields the
first ZKPPC protocol that still resists against quantum computers.
Our first technical challenge is to derive a password encoding mechanism that operates securely and
interacts smoothly with available lattice-based cryptographic tools. In the discrete log setting considered
in [31], passwords are mapped to large integers and then encoded as elements in a group of large order.
Unfortunately, this does not translate well to the lattice setting as working with large-norm objects usually
makes the construction less secure and less efficient. Therefore, a different method, which encodes pass-
words as small-norm objects, is desirable. To this end, we define a password encoding mechanism, that
maps a password consisting of t characters to a binary vector of length 8t, where each of the t blocks is
the 8-bit representation of the ASCII value of the corresponding password character. To increase its entropy,
we further shuffle the arrangement of those blocks using a random permutation, and then commit to the
permuted vector as well as a binary encoding of the permutation via the SIS-based commitment scheme
proposed by Kawachi, Tanaka and Xagawa [29]. This commitment value is then viewed as the randomised
hash value of the password.
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The next technical challenge is to prove in zero-knowledge that the committed password satisfies a policy
of the form f =
(
(kD, kU , kL, kS), nmin, nmax
)
, which demands that the password have length at least nmin
and at most nmax, and contain at least kD digits, kS symbols, kL lower-case and kU upper-case letters. To
this end, we will have to prove, for instance, that a committed length-8 block-vector belongs to the set of
vectors encoding all 10 digits. We thus need a lattice-based sub-protocol for proving set membership. In
the lattice-based world, a set membership argument system with logarithmic complexity in the cardinality
of the set was proposed in [36], exploiting Stern-like protocols [50] and Merkle hash trees. However, the
asymptotic efficiency does not come to the front when the underlying set has small, constant size. Here, we
employ a different approach, which has linear complexity but is technically simpler and practically more
efficient, based on the extend-then-permute technique for Stern’s protocol, suggested by Ling et al. [37].
Finally, we use a general framework for Stern-like protocols, put forward by Libert et al. [34], to combine
all of our sub-protocols for set membership and obtain a ZKPPC protocol.
From a practical point of view, our lattice-based ZKPPC protocol is not yet ready to be used: for a typical
setting of parameters, an execution with soundness error 2−30 has communication cost around 900 KB. We,
however, believe that there are much room for improvement and view this work as the first step in designing
post-quantum privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange systems.
RELATED WORK. The only construction of ZKPPC was proposed by Kiefer and Manulis [31] using Peder-
sen commitments [45] and a randomised password hashing scheme introduced in the same work. It commits
each character individually and uses set membership proofs to prove compliance of the entire password to
a password policy. The password hash is the sum of the committed characters and thus is linked to the set
membership proofs through the homomorphic property of the commitments used. As mentioned previously,
their protocol is vulnerable to quantum adversaries and greater diversity is desirable.
To improve the efficiency of secure password registration for VPAKE [32] and two server PAKE [33],
Kiefer and Manulis proposed blind password registration (BPR), a new class of cryptographic protocols
that prevent password leakage from the server. Using techinques introduced in [31], Kiefer and Manulis
used an efficient shuffling proof from [19] to achieve O(1) number of set membership proofs instead of
O(nmax) in ZKPPC. However, the security model considered for BPR is only suitable for honest but curious
participants. The security of ZKPPC is defined to prevent malicious users from registering bad passwords
that do not conform to the given password policy. Malicious servers also do not gain any information on the
registered password from running the ZKPPC protocol. Overall, the security model of BPR is weaker than
the capabilities of ZKPPC and available instantiations are not resistant to quantum adversaries.
An alternate approach using symmetric key primitives, secure set-based policy checking (SPC), to check
password policy was proposed in [17]. Policies are represented set-theoretically as monotone access struc-
tures and are mapped to linear secret sharing schemes (LSSS). Then, checking policy compliance corre-
sponds to verifying whether some set is in the access structure, i.e. if the set of shares can reconstruct the
secret in the LSSS. To obtain a privacy-preserving protocol for SPC, the oblivious bloom intersection (OBI)
from [16] is used. The server constructs an LSSS that only users who fulfil the policy can obtain the right
shares from the OBI and recover the secret. Knowledge of the secret is proved with a hash of the secret
with the transcript of the protocol execution and identities of the two parties, tying the protocol to the proof
of knowledge. In the proposed SPC protocol, the one-more-RSA assumption is used to guarantee that the
password registration protocol is sound when used by a malicious client. Thus, in the presence of a quantum
adversary, the SPC protocol cannot be considered sound anymore. Since the focus is on quantum resistant
blind registration of passwords with malicious participants, the SPC protocol is insufficient.
ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROOFS IN LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY. Early work on interactive and non-
interactive proof systems [24, 43, 46] for lattices exploited the geometric structure of worst-case lattice
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problems, and are not generally applicable in lattice-based cryptography. More recent methods of proving
relations appearing in lattice-based cryptosystems belong to the following two main families.
The first family, introduced by Lyubashevsky [40, 41], uses “rejection sampling” techniques, and lead
to relatively efficient proofs of knowledge of small secret vectors [9, 2, 13, 14], and proofs of linear and
multiplicative relations among committed values [10, 3] in the ideal lattice setting. However, due to the
nature of “rejection sampling”, there is a tiny probability that even an honest prover may fail to convince
the verifier: i.e., protocols in this family do not have perfect completeness. Furthermore, when proving
knowledge of vectors with norm bound β, the knowledge extractor of these protocols is only guaranteed
to produce witnesses of norm bound g · β, for some factor g > 1. This factor, called “soundness slack”
in [2, 13], may be undesirable: if an extracted witness has to be used in the security proof to solve a challenge
SIS instance, we need the SISg·β assumption, which is stronger than the SISβ assumption required by the
protocol itself. Moreover, in some sophisticated cryptographic constructions such as the zero-knowledge
password policy check protocol considered in this work, the coordinates of extracted vectors are expected to
be in {0, 1} and/or satisfy a specific pattern. Such issues seem hard to tackle using this family of protocols.
The second family, initiated by Ling et al. [37], use “decomposition-extension” techniques in lattice-
based analogues [29] of Stern’s protocol [50]. These are less efficient than those of the first family because
each protocol execution admits a constant soundness error, and require repeating protocols ω(log n) times,
for a security parameter n, to achieve negligible soundness error. On the upside, Stern-like protocols have
perfect completeness and can handle a wide range of lattice-based relations [38, 36, 12, 34, 35, 39], es-
pecially when witnesses have to not only be small or binary, but also certain prescribed arrangement of
coordinates. Furthermore, unlike protocols of the first family, the extractor of Stern-like protocols can out-
put witness vectors with the same properties expected of valid witnesses. This feature is often crucial in the
design of advanced protocols involving ZK proofs. In addition, the “soundness slack” issue is completely
avoided, so the hardness assumptions are kept “in place”.
ORGANIZATION. In the next section, we define notations used in the paper and briefly describe the building
blocks for our ZKPPC protocol. Following that, in Section 3, we instantiate the building blocks and ZKPPC
protocol with lattices-based primitives. Finally, we summarize and conclude in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
NOTATION. We assume all vectors are column vectors. A vector x with coordinates x1, . . . , xm is written
as x = (x1, . . . , xm). For simplicity, concatenation of x ∈ Rk and y ∈ Rm is denoted with (x‖y) ∈ Rk+m.
Column-wise concatenation of matrices A ∈ Rn×k and B ∈ Rn×m is denoted by [A |B] ∈ Rn×(k+m). If
S is a finite set, then x
$←− S means that x is chosen uniformly at random over S. For a positive integer n,
[n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n} and negl(n) denotes a negligible function in n. The set of all permutations of
n elements is denoted by Sn. All logarithms are of base 2.
2.1 Some Lattice-Based Cryptographic Ingredients
We first recall the average-case problem SIS and its link to worst-case lattice problems.
Definition 1 (SIS∞n,m,q,β [1, 23]). Given a uniformly random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq , find a non-zero vector
x ∈ Zm such that ‖x‖∞ ≤ β and A · x = 0 mod q.
The hardness of the SIS is guaranteed by the worst-case to average-case reduction from lattice problems. If
m,β = poly(n), and q > β · O˜(√n), then the SIS∞n,m,q,β problem is at least as hard as the worst-case lattice
problem SIVPγ for some γ = β · O˜(
√
nm) (see, e.g., [23, 42]).
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The KTX commitment scheme. In this work, we employ the SIS-based commitment scheme proposed by
Kawachi, Tanaka and Xagawa [29] (KTX). The scheme, with two flavours, works with lattice parameter n,
prime modulus q = O˜(n), and dimension m = 2n⌈log q⌉.
In the variant that commits t bits, for some fixed t = poly(n), the commitment key is (A,B)
$←− Zn×tq ×
Z
n×m
q . To commit x ∈ {0, 1}t, one samples randomness r $←− {0, 1}m, and outputs the commitment c =
A · x+B · r mod q. Then, to open c, one reveals x ∈ {0, 1}t and r ∈ {0, 1}m.
If there exists two valid openings (x1, r1) and (x2, r2) for the same commitment c and x1 6= x2, then
one can compute a solution to the SIS∞n,m+t,q,1 problem associated with the uniformly random matrix [A |
B] ∈ Zn×(m+t)q . On the other hand, by the left-over hash lemma [48], the distribution of a valid commitment
c is statistically close to uniform over Znq which implies that it is statistically hiding.
Kawachi et al. [29] extended the above t-bit commitment scheme to a string commitment scheme COM :
{0, 1}∗ ×{0, 1}m → Znq . The extended scheme shares the same characteristics, statistically hiding from the
parameters set and computationally binding under the SIS assumption.
In this work, we use the former variant to commit to passwords, and use COM as a building block for
Stern-like zero-knowledge protocols.
2.2 Zero-Knowledge Argument Systems and Stern-like Protocols
We work with statistical zero-knowledge argument systems, interactive protocols where the zero-knowledge
property holds against any cheating verifier and the soundness property holds against computationally
bounded cheating provers. More formally, let the set of statements-witnesses R = {(y,w)} ∈ {0, 1}∗ ×
{0, 1}∗ be an NP relation. A two-party game 〈P,V〉 is called an interactive argument system for the relation
R with soundness error e if two conditions hold:
– Completeness. If (y,w) ∈ R then Pr[〈P(y,w),V(y)〉 = 1] = 1.
– Soundness. If (y,w) 6∈ R, then ∀ PPT P̂ : Pr[〈P̂(y,w),V(y)〉 = 1] ≤ e.
Here and henceforth, PPT denotes probabilistic polynomial time. An argument system is statistical zero-
knowledge if for any V̂(y), there exists a PPT simulator S(y) which produces a simulated transcript that
is statistically close to that of the real interaction between P(y,w) and V̂(y). A related notion is argu-
ment of knowledge, which requires the witness-extended emulation property. For 3 move protocols (i.e.,
commitment-challenge-response), witness-extended emulation is implied by special soundness [25], which
assumes the existence of a PPT extractor, taking as input a set of valid transcripts with respect to all possible
values of the “challenge” to the same “commitment”, and returning w′ such that (y,w′) ∈ R.
Stern-like protocols. The statistical zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge presented in this work are
Stern-like [50] protocols. In particular, they are Σ-protocols as defined in [27, 9], where 3 valid transcripts
are needed for extraction instead of just 2. Stern’s protocol was originally proposed for code-based cryptog-
raphy, and adapted to lattices by Kawachi et al. [29]. It was subsequently empowered by Ling et al. [37] to
handle the matrix-vector relations associated with the SIS and inhomogeneous SIS problems and extended
to design several lattice-based schemes: group signatures [38, 36, 34, 39], policy-based signatures [12] and
group encryption [35].
The basic protocol has 3moves. With COM, the KTX string commitment scheme [29], we get a statistical
zero-knowledge argument of knowledge (ZKAoK) with perfect completeness, constant soundness error 2/3,
and communication cost O(|w| · log q), where |w| is the total bit-size of the secret vectors.
An abstraction of Stern’s protocol. We recall an abstraction of Stern’s protocol, proposed in [34]. Let
n, ℓ, q be positive integers, where ℓ ≥ n, q ≥ 2, and VALID be a subset of {0, 1}ℓ. Suppose S is a finite set
and every φ ∈ S is associated with a permutation Γφ of ℓ elements, satisfying the following conditions:
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{
w ∈ VALID ⇔ Γφ(w) ∈ VALID,
If w ∈ VALID and φ is uniform in S, then Γφ(w) is uniform in VALID.
(1)
We aim to construct a statistical ZKAoK for the following abstract relation:
Rabstract =
{
(M,v),w ∈ Zn×ℓq × Znq × VALID : M ·w = v mod q.
}
Stern’s original protocol has VALID = {w ∈ {0, 1}ℓ : wt(w) = k}, where wt(·) denotes the Hamming
weight and k < ℓ for some given k, S = Sℓ – the symmetric group on ℓ elements, and Γφ(w) = φ(w).
The conditions in (1) are key to prove that w ∈ VALID in ZK: The prover P samples φ $←− S and
the verifier V checks that Γφ(w) ∈ VALID; no additional information about w is revealed to V due to the
randomness of φ. Furthermore, to prove in ZK that M ·w = v mod q holds, P samples rw $←− Zℓq to mask
w, and convinces V instead that M · (w + rw) = M · rw + v mod q.
We describe the interaction between P and V in Figure 1. A statistically hiding and computationally
binding string commitment scheme COM, e.g. the scheme in Section 2.1, is used.
1. Commitment: Prover P samples rw
$
←− Zℓq , φ
$
←− S and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM.
Then, a commitment CMT =
(
C1, C2, C3
)
is sent to the verifier V , where
C1 = COM(φ,M · rw mod q; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γφ(rw); ρ2), C3 = COM(Γφ(w + rw mod q); ρ3).
2. Challenge: V sends a challenge Ch
$
←− {1, 2, 3} to P .
3. Response: Based on Ch, P sends RSP computed as follows:
– Ch = 1: Let tw = Γφ(w), tr = Γφ(rw), and RSP = (tw, tr, ρ2, ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Let φ2 = φ,w2 = w + rw mod q, and RSP = (φ2,w2, ρ1, ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Let φ3 = φ,w3 = rw, and RSP = (φ3,w3, ρ1, ρ2).
Verification: Receiving RSP, V proceeds as follows:
– Ch = 1: Check that tw ∈ VALID, C2 = COM(tr; ρ2), C3 = COM(tw + tr mod q; ρ3).
– Ch = 2: Check that C1 = COM(φ2,M ·w2 − v mod q; ρ1), C3 = COM(Γφ2(w2); ρ3).
– Ch = 3: Check that C1 = COM(φ3,M ·w3; ρ1), C2 = COM(Γφ3(w3); ρ2).
In each case, V outputs 1 if and only if all the conditions hold.
Fig. 1: Stern-like ZKAoK for the relation Rabstract.
The properties of the protocol are summarized in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 ([34]). Assuming that COM is a statistically hiding and computationally binding string commit-
ment scheme, the protocol in Figure 1 is a statistical ZKAoKwith perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3,
and communication cost O(ℓ log q). In particular:
– There exists a polynomial-time simulator that, on input (M,v), outputs an accepted transcript statisti-
cally close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists a polynomial-time knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment CMT and 3 valid
responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of the challenge Ch, outputs w
′ ∈ VALID such
that M ·w′ = v mod q.
The proof of the Theorem 1, which appeared in [34], employs standard simulation and extraction techniques
for Stern-like protocols [29, 37]. The proof is provided in Appendix A for the sake of completeness.
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2.3 Password Strings and Password Policies
Next, we present the models of password strings and policies, adapted from [31].
Password Strings.We consider password strings pw over the set of 94 printable characters Σall in the ASCII
alphabet ΣASCII, where Σall = ΣD ∪ΣS ∪ΣL ∪ΣU ⊂ ΣASCII is split into four disjoint subsets:
– The set of 10 digits ΣD = {0, 1, . . . , 9};
– The set of 32 symbols ΣS =
{
!”#$%&’()*+,-./ :;<=>?@ [\]ˆ ‘{|} ˜ };
– The set of 26 lower case letters, ΣL = {a, b, . . . , z};
– The set of 26 upper case letters, ΣU = {A,B, . . . , Z}.
We denote by Dict a general dictionary containing all strings that can be formed from the characters inΣall.
A password string pw = (c1, c2, . . . , ck) ∈ Σkall ⊂ Dict of length k is an ordered multi-set of characters
c1, . . . , ck ∈ Σall.
Password Policies. A password policy f =
(
(kD, kS , kL, kU ), nmin, nmax
)
has six components, a minimum
length nmin, maximum length nmax, and integers kD, kS , kL and kU that indicate the minimum number of
digits, symbols, upper-case and lower-case letters, respectively, a password string must contain. We say that
f(pw) = true if and only if policy f is satisfied by the password string pw. For instance,
1. Policy f =
(
(1, 1, 1, 1), 8, 16
)
indicates that password strings must be between 8 and 16 characters and
contain at least one digit, one symbol, one lower-case and one upper-case letters.
2. Policy f =
(
(0, 2, 0, 1), 10, 14
)
demands that password strings must be between 10 and 14 characters,
including at least two symbols and one upper-case letter.
Remark 1. In practice, password policies typically do not specify nmax but we can simply fix a number that
upper-bounds all reasonable password lengths.
2.4 Randomised Password Hashing and Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check
We now recall the notions of randomised password hashing and zero-knowledge password policy check.
Our presentation follows [31, 30].
Randomised Password Hashing. This mechanism aims to compute some password verification informa-
tion that can be used later in more advanced protocols (e.g., ZKPPC and VPAKE). In order to prevent off-line
dictionary attacks, the computation process is randomised via a pre-hash salt and hash salt. More formally, a
randomised password hashing schemeH is a tuple of 5 algorithmsH = (Setup,PreSalt,PreHash,Salt,Hash),
defined as follows.
– Setup(λ): On input security parameter λ, generate public parameters pp, including the descriptions of
the salt spaces SP and SH .
– PreSalt(pp): On input pp, output a random pre-hash salt sP ∈ SP .
– PreHash(pp, pw, sP ): On input pp, password pw and pre-hash salt sP , output a pre-hash value P .
– Salt(pp): On input pp, output a random hash salt sH ∈ SH .
– Hash(pp, P, sP , sH): On input pp, pre-hash value P , pre-hash salt sP and hash salt sH , output a hash
value h.
A secure randomised password hashing scheme H must satisfy 5 requirements: pre-image resistance,
second pre-image resistance, pre-hash entropy preservation, entropy preservation and password hiding.
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– Pre-image resistance (or tight one-wayness in [11]): Let pp ← Setup(λ) and Dict be a dictionary of
min-entropy β. Hash(·) is a function such that (Hi, sHi) ← Hash(·), where sHi ← Salt(pp) and
Hi ← Hash(pp, Pi, sPi , sHi). Pi ← PreHash(pp, pwi, sPi) with sPi ← PreSalt(pp) and pwi $←− Dict.
Pi is stored byHash(·) and there is a function Verify(i, P ) such that Verify(i, P ) = 1 if P = Pi.
For all PPT adversaries A running in time at most t, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
Pr[(i, P )← AHash(·)); Verify(i, P ) = 1] ≤ αt
2βtPreHash
+ ε(λ)
for small α and tPreHash, the running time of PreHash.
– Second pre-image resistance: For all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that
for P ′ ← A(pp, P, sH),
Pr
[(
P ′ 6= P ) ∧ (Hash(pp, P, sH) = Hash(pp, P ′, sH))] ≤ ε(λ),
where pp ← Setup(λ), sP ← PreSalt(pp), sH ← Salt(pp) and P ← Hash(pp, pw, sP ) for any pw
∈ Dict.
– Pre-hash entropy preservation: For all dictionaries Dict that are samplable in polynomial time with
min-entropy β and any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that for (P, sP )←
A(pp) with pp← Setup(λ) and random password pw $←− Dict,
Pr
[(
sP ∈ SP
) ∧ (P = PreHash(pp, pw, sP ))] ≤ 2−β + ε(λ).
– Entropy preservation: For all min-entropy β polynomial-time samplable dictionaries Dict and any PPT
adversary A, there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that for (H, sP , sH)← A(pp)
Pr
[(
sP ∈ SP
) ∧ (sH ∈ SH ∧H = Hash(pp, pw, sP , sH))] ≤ 2−β + ε(λ),
where pp← Setup(λ) and pw $←− Dict.
– Password hiding: For all PPT adversaries A = (A1,A2), where A1(pp) outputs two equal length
passwords pw0, pw1 for pp ← Setup(λ) and A2(H) outputs a bit b′ for H ← Hash(pp, P, sP , sH),
where sH ← Salt(λ), sP ← PreSalt(λ) and P ← PreHash(pp, pwb, sP ) for a random bit b $←− {0, 1},
there exists a negligible function ε(·) such that∣∣Pr[b = b′]− 12 ∣∣ ≤ ε(λ).
Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check. Let H = (Setup,PreSalt,PreHash,Salt,Hash) be a ran-
domised password hashing scheme. A password policy check (PPC) is an interactive protocol between a
client and server where the password policy f =
(
(kD, kS , kL, kU ), nmin, nmax
)
of the server and public
parameters pp ← Setup(λ) are used as common inputs. At the end of the execution, the server accepts a
hash value h of any password pw of the client’s choice if and only if f(pw) = true. A PPC protocol is
an argument of knowledge of the password pw and ssrandomness sP ← PreSalt(pp), sH ← Salt(pp) used
for hashing. To prevent leaking the password to the server, one additionally requires that the protocol be
zero-knowledge.
More formally, a zero-knowledge PPC protocol is an interactive protocol between a prover (client) and
verifier (server), in which, given (pp, f,h) the former convinces the later in zero-knowledge that the former
knows pw and randomness (sP , sH) such that:
f(pw) = true and Hash(pp, P, sP , sH) = h,
where P ← PreHash(pp, pw, sP ).
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3 Our Constructions
To construct randomised password hashing schemes and ZKPPC protocols from concrete computational
assumptions, the first challenge is to derive a password encoding mechanism that operates securely and in-
teracts smoothly with the hashing and zero-knowledge layers. In the discrete log setting considered in [31],
passwords are mapped to large integers and then encoded as elements in a group of large order. Unfortu-
nately, this does not translate well to the lattice setting as working with large-norm objects usually reduces
the security and efficiency of the construction. Therefore, a different method, which encodes passwords as
small-norm objects, is desirable. In this work, we will therefore use binary vectors.
Let bin(·) be the function that maps non-negative integers to their binary decomposition. For any charac-
ter c encoded in ASCII, let ASCII(c) ∈ [0, 255] be its code. Then, we define enc(c) for an ASCII encoded
character c and enc(pw) for some length-t password pw = (c1, . . . , ct) ∈ Σt as
enc(c) = bin(ASCII(c)) ∈ {0, 1}8,
encode(pw) =
(
enc(c1)‖ . . . ‖enc(ct)
) ∈ {0, 1}8t.
3.1 Notations, Sets and Permutations
Let m, n be arbitrary positive integers. We define the following sets and permutations:
⋄ B2
m
: the set of all vectors in {0, 1}2m whose Hamming weight is exactly m. Note that for x ∈ Z2m and
ψ ∈ S2m the following holds:{
x ∈ B2
m
⇔ ψ(x) ∈ B2
m
;
x ∈ B2
m
and ψ
$←− S2m, then ψ(x) is uniform over B2m.
(2)
⋄ Tψ,n, for ψ ∈ Sm: the permutation that, when applied to a vector v = (v1‖v2‖ . . . ‖vm) ∈ Znm,
consisting of m blocks of size n, re-arranges the blocks of v according to ψ, as follows,
Tψ,n(v) = (vψ(1)‖vψ(2)‖ . . . ‖vψ(n)).
For convenience, when working with password alphabet Σall = ΣD ∪ΣS ∪ΣL ∪ΣU and password policy
f =
(
(kD, kU , kL, kS), nmin, nmax
)
, we introduce the following notations and sets:
⋄ ηD = |ΣD| = 10, ηS = |ΣS | = 32, ηL = |ΣL| = 26, ηU = |ΣU | = 26 and ηall = |Σall| = 94.
⋄ For α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all}: Encα = {enc(w))
∣∣ w ∈ Σα}.
⋄ SETα for α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all}: the set of all vectors v = (v1‖ . . . ‖vηα) ∈ {0, 1}8ηα , such that the
blocks v1, . . . ,vηα ∈ {0, 1}8 are exactly the binary encodings of all characters in Σα, i.e.,{
v1, . . . ,vηα
}
=
{
enc(w)) : w ∈ Σα
}
.
⋄ SETnmax : the set of all vectors v = (v1‖ . . . ‖vnmax) ∈ {0, 1}nmax⌈log nmax⌉, such that the blocks v1, . . . ,vnmax ∈
{0, 1}⌈log nmax⌉ are exactly the binary decompositions of all integers in [nmax], i.e.,{
v1, . . . ,vnmax
}
=
{
bin(1), . . . , bin(nmax)
}
.
Observe that the following properties hold.
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⋄ For all α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all}, all x ∈ Z8ηα and all ψ ∈ Sηα :{
x ∈ SETα ⇔ Tψ,8(x) ∈ SETα;
x ∈ SETα and ψ $←− Sηα , then Tψ,8(x) is uniform over SETα.
(3)
⋄ For all x ∈ Znmax⌈lognmax⌉ and all ψ ∈ Snmax :{
x ∈ SETnmax ⇔ Tψ,⌈log nmax⌉(x) ∈ x ∈ SETnmax ;
x ∈ SETnmax and ψ $←− Snmax , then Tψ,⌈log nmax⌉(x) is uniform over SETnmax .
(4)
3.2 Randomised Password Hashing from Lattices
We describe our randomised password hashing schemeL for passwords of length between two given integers
nmin and nmax. At a high level, our scheme maps characters of the password pw to binary block vectors, re-
arranges them with a random permutation χ, and finally computes the password hash as a KTX commitment
([29], see also Section 2.1) to a vector storing all the information on pw and χ. The scheme works as follows,
L.Setup(λ). On input security parameter λ, the algorithm performs the following steps:
1. Choose parameters n = O(λ), prime modulus q = O˜(n), and dimension m = 2n⌈log q⌉.
2. Sample matrices A
$←− Zn×(nmax⌈log nmax⌉+8nmax)q and B $←− Zn×mq .
3. Let the pre-hash salt space be SP = Snmax - the set of all permutations of nmax elements, and hash
salt space be SH = {0, 1}m.
4. Output the public parameters pp =
(
n, q,m,SP ,SH ,A,B
)
.
L.PreSalt(pp). Sample χ $←− Snmax and output sP = χ.
L.PreHash(pp, pw, sP ). Let sP = χ ∈ Snmax and t ∈ [nmin, nmax] be the length of password pw. The
pre-hash value P is computed as follows.
1. Compute encode(pw) ∈ {0, 1}8t, consisting of t blocks of length 8.
2. Insert nmax − t blocks of length 8, each one being enc(g) for some non-printable ASCII character
g ∈ ΣASCII \Σall, into the block-vector encode(pw) to get e ∈ {0, 1}8nmax .1
3. Apply Tχ,8 to get e
′ = Tχ,8(e) ∈ {0, 1}8nmax .
4. Output the pre-hash value P = e′.
L.Salt(pp). Sample r $←− {0, 1}m and output sH = r.
L.Hash(pp, P, sP , sH). Let P = e′ ∈ {0, 1}8nmax , sP = χ ∈ Snmax and sH = r ∈ {0, 1}m. The hash value
h is computed as follows,
1. Express the permutation χ as χ = [χ(1), . . . , χ(nmax)], where for each i ∈ [nmax], χ(i) ∈ [nmax].
Then, form
e0 =
(
bin(χ(1)− 1)‖ . . . ‖bin(χ(nmax)− 1)
) ∈ {0, 1}nmax⌈lognmax⌉.
2. Form x = (e0‖e′) ∈ {0, 1}nmax⌈lognmax⌉+8nmax and output h = A · x+B · r ∈ Znq .
1 This hides the actual length t of the password in the ZKPPC protocol in Section 3.4.
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In the following theorem, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme satisfies the security requirements
defined in Section 2.4.
Theorem 2. Under the SIS assumption, the randomised password hashing scheme, L, described above
satisfies 5 requirements: pre-image resistance, second pre-image resistance, pre-hash entropy preservation,
entropy preservation and password hiding.
Proof. First, we remark that, by construction, if the pre-hash salt sP = χ is given, then we can reverse
the procedure used to extend the length t password by simply discarding any non-printable characters after
applying the inverse of the permutation specified by sP . Hence, if sP is hidden, then due to its randomness,
the min-entropy of P is larger than the min-entropy of pw. Thus, the proposed hashing scheme has the
pre-hash entropy preservation and entropy preservation properties.
Next, note that h = A ·x+B · r mod q is a proper KTX commitment of message x with randomness r.
Thus, from the statistical hiding property of the commitment scheme, the password hiding property holds.
Furthermore, if one can produce distinct pre-hash values P , P ′ that yield the same hash value h, then
one can use these values to break the computational binding property of the KTX commitment scheme. This
implies that second pre-image resistance property holds under the SIS assumption.
Finally, over the randomness of matrix A, password pw and pre-hash salt sP , except for a negligible
probability (i.e., in the event one accidentally finds a solution to the SIS problem associated with matrixA),
vector A · x accepts at least 2β values in Znq , where β is the min-entropy of the dictionary Dict from which
pw is chosen. Therefore, even ifA · x = h−B · sH mod q is given, to find P = e′, one has to perform 2β
invocations of PreHash which implies that the scheme satisfies the pre-image resistance property. ⊓⊔
3.3 Techniques for Proving Set Membership
In our construction of ZKPPC in Section 3.4, we will have to prove that a linear relation of the form∑
i
(
public matrix Mi
) · (binary secret vector si) = h mod q
holds, where each secret vector si must be an element of a given set of relatively small cardinality, e.g.,
EncD,EncS ,EncL,EncU ,Encall. Thus, we need to design suitable sub-protocols to prove set membership.
In the lattice-based world, a set membership argument system with logarithmic complexity in the car-
dinality of the set was proposed in [36], exploiting Stern-like protocols and Merkle hash trees. Despite its
asymptotic efficiency, the actual efficiency is worse when the underlying set has small, constant size. To
tackle the problems encountered here, we employ a different approach, which has linear complexity but is
technically simpler and practically more efficient.
Suppose we have to prove that an n-dimensional vector si belongs to a set ofm vectors {v1, . . . ,vm}. To
this end, we append m−1 blocks to vector si to get an nm-dimensional vector s⋆i whosem blocks are exactly
elements of the set {v1, . . . ,vm}. At the same time, we append n(m−1) zero-columns to public matrixMi
to get matrix M⋆i satisfying M
⋆
i · s⋆i = Mi · si, so that we preserve the linear equation under consideration.
In this way, we reduce the set-membership problem to the problem of proving the well-formedness of s⋆i .
The latter can be done via random permutations of blocks in the framework of Stern’s protocol. For instance,
to prove that si ∈ EncD, i.e., si is a correct binary encoding of a digit, we extend it to s⋆i ∈ SETD, apply a
random permutation to the extended vector, and make use of the properties observed in (3).
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3.4 Zero-Knowledge Password Policy Check Protocol
We now present our construction of ZKPPC from lattices. Throughout, we use notations, sets and permuta-
tion techniques specified in Section 3.1 to reduce the statement to be proved to an instance of the relation
Rabstract considered in Section 2.2, which in turn can be handled by the Stern-like protocol of Figure 1.
Our protocol allows a prover P to convince a verifier V in ZK that P knows a password pw that hashes
to a given value with randomness χ, r, and satisfies some policy f =
(
(kD, kU , kL, kS), nmin, nmax
)
.2 Re-
call that V demands pw must have length between nmin and nmax inclusive, contain at least kD digits, kS
symbols, kL lower-case and kU upper-case letters. For simplicity, we let kall = nmin− (kD+kU +kL+kS).
The common input consists of matrices A ∈ Zn×(nmax⌈lognmax⌉+8nmax)q ,B ∈ Zn×mq , hash value h ∈ Znq
and extra information
∆ = (δD,1, . . . , δD,kD , δS,1, . . . , δS,kS , δL,1, . . . , δL,kL , δU,1, . . . , δU,kU , δall,1, . . . , δall,kall) ∈ [nmax]nmin ,
which indicates the positions of the blocks, inside vector P = e′, encoding kD digits, kS symbols, kL lower-
case letters, kU upper-case letters and kall other printable characters within pw. Revealing ∆ to V does not
harm P, since the original positions of those blocks (in vector e) are protected by the secret permutation χ.
The prover’s witness consists of vectors x = (e0‖e′) ∈ {0, 1}nmax⌈lognmax⌉+8nmax and r ∈ {0, 1}m
satisfying the following conditions:
1. A · x+B · r = h mod q;
2. e0 =
(
bin(χ(1) − 1) ‖ . . . ‖ bin(χ(nmax − 1))
)
;
3. e′ has the form (x1, . . . ,xnmax), where, for all α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all} and all i ∈ [kα], it holds that
xδα,i ∈ Encα.
We first observe that, if we express matrix A as A =
[
A0 | A1 | . . . | Anmax
]
, where A0 ∈ Znmax⌈log nmax⌉q
and A1, . . . ,Anmax ∈ Zn×8q , then equation A · x+B · r = h mod q can be equivalently written as
A0 · e0 +
∑
α∈{D,S,L,U,all},i∈[kα]
Aδα,i · xδα,i +
∑
j∈[nmax]\∆
Aj · xj +B · r = h mod q. (5)
Note that, we have e0 ∈ SETnmax . We next transform the witness vectors x1, . . . ,xnmax , r as follows,
⋄ For all α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all} and all i ∈ [kα], to prove that xδα,i ∈ Encα, we append ηα − 1 suitable
blocks to xδα,i to get vector x
⋆
δα,i
∈ SETα.
⋄ For vectors {xj}j∈[nmax]\∆, note that it is necessary and sufficient to prove that they are binary vec-
tors (namely, they are encoding of characters that may or may not be printable). Similarly, we have
to prove that r is a binary vector. To this end, we let y ∈ {0, 1}8(nmax−nmin) be a concatenation of
all {xj}j∈[nmax]\∆ and z = (y‖r) ∈ {0, 1}8(nmax−nmin)+m. Then, we append suitable binary entries
to z to get z⋆ ∈ {0, 1}2(8(nmax−nmin)+m) with Hamming weight exactly 8(nmax − nmin) + m, i.e.,
z⋆ ∈ B28(nmax−nmin)+m.
Having performed the above transformations, we construct the vector w ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, where
ℓ = nmax⌈log nmax⌉+ 8(kDηD + kSηS + kLηL + kUηU ) + 8kallηall + 2(8(nmax − nmin) +m),
and w has the form:
2 The construction we present considers the scenario where kD, kS, kL, kU are all positive. Our scheme can be easily adjusted to
handle the case where one or more of them are 0.
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w =
(
e0 ‖ x⋆δD,1 ‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δD,kD ‖ x
⋆
δS,1
‖ . . . ‖x⋆δS,kS ‖ x
⋆
δL,1
‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δL,kL
‖ x⋆δU,1 ‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δU,kU ‖ x
⋆
δall,1
‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δall,kall ‖ z
⋆
)
. (6)
When performing extensions over the secret vectors, we also append zero-columns to the public matrices
in equation (5) so that it is preserved. Then, we concatenate the extended matrices to get M ∈ Zn×ℓq such
that (5) becomes, with v = h ∈ Znq ,
M ·w = v mod q. (7)
We have now established the first step towards reducing the given statement to an instance of the rela-
tion Rabstract from Section 2.2. Next, we will specify the set VALID containing the vector w, set S and
permutations {Γφ : φ ∈ S} such that the conditions in (1) hold.
Define VALID as the set of all vectors w ∈ {0, 1}ℓ having the form (6), where
⋄ e0 ∈ SETnmax ;
⋄ x⋆δα,i ∈ SETα for all α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all} and all i ∈ [kα];
⋄ z⋆ ∈ B28(nmax−nmin)+m.
It can be seen that the vector w obtained above belongs to this tailored set VALID. Next, let us define the
set of permutations S as follows,
S = Snmax ×
(SηD)kD × (SηS)kS × (SηL)kL × (SηU )kU × (Sηall)kall × S2(8(nmax−nmin)+m).
Then, for each element
φ =
(
π, τD,1, . . . , τD,kD , τS,1, . . . , τS,kS , τL,1, . . . , τL,kL , τU,1, . . . , τU,kU , τall,1, . . . , τall,kall, θ
) ∈ S,
we define the permutation Γφ that, when applied to w ∈ Zℓ of the form
w =
(
e0 ‖ x⋆δD,1 ‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δD,kD ‖ x
⋆
δS,1
‖ . . . ‖x⋆δS,kS ‖ x
⋆
δL,1
‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δL,kL
‖ x⋆δU,1 ‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δU,kU ‖ x
⋆
δall,1
‖ . . . ‖ x⋆δall,kall ‖ z
⋆
)
.
where e0 ∈ Znmax⌈log nmax⌉, x⋆δα,i ∈ Z8ηα for all α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all} and i ∈ kα, and z⋆ ∈ Z2(8(nmax−nmin)+m),
it transforms the blocks of vector w as follows,
⋄ e0 7→ Tπ,⌈lognmax⌉(e0).
⋄ For all α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all} and all i ∈ kα: x⋆δα,i 7→ Tτα,i,8(x⋆δα,i).
⋄ z⋆ 7→ θ(z⋆).
Based on the properties observed in (2), (3), and (4), it can be seen that we have satisfied the conditions
specified in (1), namely,{
w ∈ VALID ⇔ Γφ(w) ∈ VALID,
If w ∈ VALID and φ is uniform in S, then Γφ(w) is uniform in VALID.
Having reduced the considered statement to an instance of the relation Rabstract, let us now describe how
our protocol is executed. The protocol uses the KTX string commitment scheme COM, which is statistically
hiding and computationally binding under the SIS assumption. Prior to the interaction, the prover P and
verifier V construct the matrix M and vector v based on the common inputs (A,B,h,∆), while P builds
the vector w ∈ VALID from vectors x and r, as discussed above. Then, P and V interact per Figure 1. We
thus obtain the following result, as a corollary of Theorem 1.
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Theorem 3. Under the SIS assumption, the protocol above is a ZKPPC protocol with respect to the ran-
domised password hashing scheme L from Section 3.2 and policy f = ((kD, kU , kL, kS), nmin, nmax). The
protocol is a statistical ZKAoK with perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3 and communication cost
O(ℓ log q).
Proof. Perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3 and communication costO(ℓ log q) of the protocol follow
from the use of the abstract protocol in Figure 1. For simulation, we simply run the simulator of Theorem 1.
As for knowledge extraction, we first run the knowledge extractor of Theorem 1 to get the vector w′ ∈
VALID such that M ·w′ = v mod q. Then, we “backtrack” the transformations to extract from w′, vectors
x′ = (e′0‖x′1‖ . . . ‖x′nmax) ∈ {0, 1}nmax⌈log nmax⌉+8nmax and r′ ∈ {0, 1}m such that
⋄ A · x′ +B · r′ = h mod q;
⋄ e′0 ∈ SETnmax ;
⋄ For all α ∈ {D,S,L,U, all} and all i ∈ kα: x′δα,i ∈ Encα.
Notice that one can recover a permutation of nmax elements from an element of SETnmax . Let χ
′ be the
permutation encoded by e′0. Then, by applying the inverse permutation T
−1
χ′,8 to (x
′
1‖ . . . ‖x′nmax), we recover
e′ ∈ {0, 1}8nmax . Finally, by removing potential blocks of length 8 that correspond to encodings of non-
printable ASCII characters from e′, we obtain a vector that encodes some password string pw′ satisfying
policy f . ⊓⊔
Efficiency analysis. By inspection, we can see that, without using the big-O notation, each round of the
proposed protocol has communication cost slightly larger than
ℓ log q =
(
nmax⌈log nmax⌉+8(kDηD+ kSηS + kLηL+ kUηU )+8kallηall+2(8(nmax−nmin)+m)
)
log q.
Let us estimate the cost in practice. Note that the KTX commitment scheme can work with relatively
small lattice parameters, e.g., n = 256, log q = 10, m = 5120. For a common password policy f =(
(1, 1, 1, 1), 8, 16
)
, the communication cost would be about 17 KB. As each round has a soundness error of
2/3, one may have to repeat the protocol many times in parallel to achieve a high level of confidence. For
instance, if a soundness error of 2−30 is required, then one can repeat 52 times for a final cost of around 900
KB. In practical implementations, one can exploit various optimizations (e.g., instead of sending a random
vector, one can send the PRNG seed used to generate it) to reduce the communication complexity.
4 Conclusion and Open Questions
Through the use of the KTX commitment scheme [29] and a Stern-like zero-knowledge argument of set
membership, we designed a lattice-based zero-knowledge protocol for proving that a committed/hashed
password sent to the server satisfies the required password policy. All together, we obtain the first ZKPPC
that is based on the hardness of the SIS problem which to date remains quantum resistant. Unfortunately,
there are no viable VPAKE protocols from lattices that can be coupled with our ZKPPC protocol to construct
a complete privacy-preserving password-based authentication and key exchange system.
Our proposed ZKPPC protocol can be employed to securely register chosen passwords at remote servers
with the following security guarantees: (1) Registered passwords are not disclosed to the server until used;
(2) Each registered password provably conforms to the specified password policy. Although not being ready
to be deployed in practice, we view this work as the first step in designing post-quantum privacy-preserving
password-based authentication and key exchange systems.
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We leave several open questions as potential future work: (1) to construct a more practical lattice-based
ZKPPC; (2) to develop a lattice-based VPAKE; and (3) to extend lattice-based ZKPPC to other PAKE
protocols, such as two-server PAKE, where the passwords are secretly shared between two servers, of which
we assume at most one to be compromisable. The third question is similar to the one asked by Kiefer and
Manulis [31] and as they noted, it is a challenge even in the classical discrete logarithm setting.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We provide the proof of Theorem 1 as it appears in [34] but first restate the theorem.
Theorem 1. The protocol in Figure 1 is a statistical ZKAoKwith perfect completeness, soundness error 2/3,
and communication cost O(ℓ log q). Namely:
– There exists a polynomial-time simulator that, on input (M,v), outputs an accepted transcript statisti-
cally close to that produced by the real prover.
– There exists a polynomial-time knowledge extractor that, on input a commitment CMT and 3 valid
responses (RSP1,RSP2,RSP3) to all 3 possible values of the challenge Ch, outputs w
′ ∈ VALID such
that M ·w′ = v mod q.
Proof. Perfect completeness of the protocol can be checked: If a prover follows the protocol honestly, the
verifier will always accept. It is also easy to see that the communication cost is bounded by O(ℓ log q).
We now prove that the protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge argument of knowledge.
Zero-Knowledge Property. We construct a PPT simulator SIM interacting with a (possibly dishonest)
verifier V̂ , such that, given only the public inputs, with probability negligibly close to 2/3, SIM outputs a
simulated transcript that is statistically close to the one produced by the honest prover in the real interaction.
SIM first chooses uniformly at random, Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3}, its prediction of Ch that V̂ will not choose.
Case Ch = 1: Using basic linear algebra over Zq, SIM computes a vector w
′ ∈ Zℓq such that M · w′ =
v mod q. Next, it samples rw
$←− Zℓq, φ $←− S , and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Finally, it sends the
commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂ , where
C ′1 = COM(φ,M · rw; ρ1), C ′2 = COM(Γφ(rw); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Γφ(w′ + rw); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂ , the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP =
(
φ,w′ + rw, ρ1, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
φ, rw, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 2: SIM samples w′
$←− VALID, rw $←− Zℓq, φ $←− S , and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then, it
sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂ , where
C ′1 = COM(φ,M · rw; ρ1), C ′2 = COM(Γφ(rw); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Γφ(w′ + rw); ρ3).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂ , the simulator responds as follows:
– If Ch = 1: Send RSP =
(
Γφ(w
′), Γφ(rw), ρ2, ρ3
)
.
– If Ch = 2: Output ⊥ and abort.
– If Ch = 3: Send RSP =
(
φ, rw, ρ1, ρ2
)
.
Case Ch = 3: SIM samples w′
$←− VALID, rw $←− Zℓq, φ $←− S , and randomness ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 for COM. Then, it
sends the commitment CMT =
(
C ′1, C
′
2, C
′
3
)
to V̂ , where C ′2 = COM(Γφ(rw); ρ2), C ′3 = COM(Γφ(w′ +
rw); ρ3) as in the previous two cases, while
C ′1 = COM(φ,M · (w′ + rw)− v; ρ1).
Receiving a challenge Ch from V̂ , it responds as follows:
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– If Ch = 1: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 2, Ch = 1).
– If Ch = 2: Send RSP computed as in the case (Ch = 1, Ch = 2).
– If Ch = 3: Output ⊥ and abort.
Observe that, in each of the cases considered above, since COM is statistically hiding, the distribution of
the commitment CMT and challenge Ch from V̂ are statistically close to those in the real interaction.
Hence, the probability that the simulator outputs ⊥ is negligibly close to 1/3. Moreover, one can check
that whenever the simulator does not halt, it will provide an accepted transcript, the distribution of which
is statistically close to the prover’s in the real interaction. In other words, the constructed simulator can
successfully impersonate the honest prover with probability negligibly close to 2/3.
Argument of Knowledge. Suppose RSP1 = (tw, tr, ρ2, ρ3), RSP2 = (φ2,w2, ρ1, ρ3) and RSP3 =
(φ3,w3, ρ1, ρ2) are 3 valid responses to the same commitment CMT = (C1, C2, C3), with respect to all 3
possible values of the challenge. The validity of these responses implies that:
tw ∈ VALID;
C1 = COM(φ2,M ·w2 − v mod q; ρ1) = COM(φ3,M ·w3; ρ1);
C2 = COM(tr; ρ2) = COM(Γφ3(w3); ρ2);
C3 = COM(tw + tr mod q; ρ3) = COM(Γφ2(w2); ρ3).
Since COM is computationally binding, it implies that{
tw ∈ VALID; φ2 = φ3; tr = Γφ3(w3); tw + tr = Γφ2(w2) mod q;
M ·w2 − v = M ·w3 mod q.
(8)
Since tw ∈ VALID, if we let w′ = [Γφ2 ]−1(tw), then w′ ∈ VALID. Furthermore, we have
Γφ2(w
′) + Γφ2(w3) = Γφ2(w2) mod q,
which means that w′ + w3 = w2 mod q, and M · w′ + M · w3 = M · w2 mod q. As a result, we have
M ·w′ = v mod q, concluding the proof. ⊓⊔
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